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Abstract. Our work focuses on the design of a scalable permissionless blockchain
in the proof-of-stake setting. In particular, we use a distributed hash table as a
building block to set up randomized shards, and then leverage the sharded archi-
tecture to validate blocks in an efficient manner. We combine verifiable Byzan-
tine agreements run by shards of stakeholders and a block validation protocol to
guarantee that forks occur with negligible probability. We impose induced churn
to make shards robust to eclipse attacks, and we rely on the UTXO coin model
to guarantee that any stakeholder action is securely verifiable by anyone. Our
protocol works against adaptive adversary, and makes no synchrony assumption
beyond what is required for the byzantine agreement.
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1 Introduction
Permissionless blockchains, also called distributed ledgers, initially appeared as the
technological solution for the deployment of the Bitcoin digital cryptocurrency and pay-
ment system [23]. Permissionless blockchains aim at achieving the impressive result of
being a persistent, distributed, consistent and continuously growing log of transactions,
publicly auditable and writable by anyone. Despite the openness of the environment
and thus the inescapable presence of malicious behaviors, security and consistency of
permissionless blockchains do not demand the presence of a trusted third party.
This is a real achievement, which mainly results from the tight combination of two
ingredients: a randomized election of the next block of transactions to be appended to
the blockchain and a short latency broadcast primitive. While the latter one relies on the
properties of peer-to-peer networks, the former one has so far been commonly imple-
mented by solving proof-of-work (PoW), a cryptographic puzzle that is provably secure
against a large proportion of participants that may wish to disrupt the system, and al-
lows to keep the rate at which blocks are created parametrizable and independent of the
size of the system. This second aspect is important to guarantee that the ratio between
the message transmission delay and the block time interval remains low enough what-
ever the system activity, guaranteeing accordingly an easy management of conflicting
blocks, if any.
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Unfortunately, resilience of PoW-based solutions fundamentally relies on the mas-
sive use of computational resources, which is a real issue today. Lot of investigations
have been devoted to find a secure alternative to PoW, but most of them either rely
on the intensive use of a large quantity of physical resources (e.g., proof-of-space [5],
proof-of-space/time [22]) or makes compromises in their trust assumptions (e.g. proof-
of-elapsed-time [18], delegated proof-of-stake [14]). In contrast, solutions based on
proof-of-stake (PoS) seem to be a quite promising way to build secure and permis-
sionless blockchains. Indeed, proof-of-stake rely on a limited but abstract resource, the
crypto-currency, in such a way that the probability for a participant to create the next
block of the blockchain is generally proportional to the fraction of currency owned by
this participant. It is an elegant alternative in the sense that all the information needed
to verify the legitimacy of a stakeholder to create a block (i.e., crypto-currency pos-
session) is already stored in the blockchain. Finally, by being a sustainable alternative
(creating a block requires a few number of operations), scalability concerns, exhibited
by PoW-based solutions, should be a priori more tractable.
An important condition for a PoS-blockchain to be secure is randomness. The cre-
ator of the next block must be truly random, and the source of randomness must not
be biaised by any adversarial strategy. So far, this has been achieved by two main
approaches: chain-based consensus and block-wise Byzantine agreement with respec-
tively Ourobouros [8] and Algorand [16] as main representatives. In the former ap-
proach, a snapshot of the current users’ status is periodically taken, from which the
the next sequence of leaders is computed. In the latter one, a Byzantine agreement
per block, relying on the properties of verifiable random cryptographic schemes, is
achieved. High robustness against adaptive adversarial strategies results from the dy-
namic participation of thousands of users, each one participating for a single step of the
algorithm.
In this paper we present a new blockchain protocol called STAKECUBE which aims
at improving scalability of the block-wise Byzantine agreement approach by combining
sharding techniques, users presence and stake transfer to operate in a PoS setting. The
key idea of STAKECUBE is to organise users (i.e. stakeholders) into shards— such that
the number of shards increases sub-linearly with the total number of active UTXOs—
and within each shard, to randomly choose a constant size committee in charge of exe-
cuting the distributed algorithms that contribute to the creation of blocks. Each block at
height h in the blockchain is by design unique (no fork), and once a block is accepted
in the blockchain, the next one is created by a sub-committee of shards whose selection
is random with a distribution that depends on the content of the last accepted block.
To make such a solution correct in presence of a Byzantine adversary, we guarantee
that the adversary cannot predict the shards in which users will sit, and that the sojourn
time of users in their shard is limited. Doing so is an effective way to protect the system
against eclipse attacks [2,6]. We introduce the notion of unpredictable and perishable
users’ credentials. Then to cope with this induced churn, shards’ views are updated,
signed and installed once, and this occurs right before the acceptation of a new block.
Finally, the creation of blocks is efficiently handled by an agreement among a verifiable
sub-committee of shards. We might expect that solely relying on stakeholders (i.e.,
owners of the coins of the crypto-currency system) to the secure construction of the
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blockchain makes sense due to their incentive to be fully involved in the blockchain
governance, rather than delegating it to powerful miners. However the analysis against
rational players is left as future work.
The remaining of the paper organised as follows. Section 2 presents related work,
Section 3 details our model and assumptions while Section 4 formalises the addressed
problem. Section 5 describes an high-level view of the required building blocks of
STAKECUBE while Section 6 presents the design principles of the proposed solution.
A security analysis is provided in Section 7 before concluding in Section 8.
2 Related work
Omniledger [20] is the closest work to ours. It is a PoS-compatible, sharded, distributed
ledger, resilient against a weakly dynamic adversary that corrupts up to 14 of partici-
pants. In contrast to our approach, Omniledger assumes a strongly synchronous setting,
and each shard maintains its own ledger and, global synchronisation of transactions is
achieved through an atomic commit protocol tailored to their usage. Ouroboros [19],
representative of the chain-based approach, is a synchronous PoS protocol resilient
against a weakly dynamic adversary that owns 1/2− ε of stake. Moreover, Ouroboros
has been recently improved to work in the partially synchronous setting against a dy-
namic adversary [8,7], but keeping the same design principles as the original one. In
Ouroboros, a unique leader is elected at each round to broadcast its block which con-
trasts with our sharded approach where the block creation process is distributed. Snow
White [13] is a synchronous PoS protocol resilient against a weakly dynamic adver-
sary that owns 1/2 of the active stake. This protocol also relies on a leader election.
Algorand [16], is a representative of the blockwise Byzantine agreement approach. It
provides a distributed ledger against an strongly adaptive adversary without assuming
strong synchrony assumptions. However, by its design, agreement for each block of the
blockchain is achieved by involving a very large number of stakeholders so that each
one needs to effectively participate only for one exchange of messages.
3 Model
We assume a large, finite set of users whose composition may change over time. Users
do not have synchronized clocks, but their individual clocks drift at the same rate. Users
communicate by propagating messages within the system. The delivery of network
messages is at the discretion of the adversary, but subject to synchrony assumptions.
Our construction in itself makes no synchrony assumption except for what is required
for the Byzantine resilient building blocks. Since our construction uses multiple build-
ing blocks, synchrony assumptions may be changed if they are instantiated differently
than suggested. Users have access to basic cryptographic functions, including a crypto-
graphic hash function h, and a CPA-secure signature scheme. Function h is modeled as
a random oracle. Users own some minimal amount of stake (i.e. money), which gives
them the right to participate to STAKECUBE. We adopt (a simplified version of) what
is commonly known as the Bitcoin Unspent Transaction Output (UTXO) model. An
UTXO can be roughly seen as a user’s account credited by some stake. An UTXO is
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uniquely characterized by a public key pki and its associated amount of stake si. Each
public key is related to the digital signature schema Σ with the uniqueness property,
which allows stakeholders to use the public keys (or a hash thereof) of their UTXOs
as a reference to them, as demonstrated in the ”Public Keys as Identities principle” of
Chaum [10]. Note that the number of users evolves according to the UTXO set. At any
time, a user can own multiple UTXOs. UTXOs can be debited only once, and once
debited, an UTXO does not exist anymore. To simplify discussion, transactions outputs
do not contain h(pki) but directly pki.
Threat model: A weakly adaptive adversary We assume the presence of Byzantine
(i.e. malicious) users which controls up to µ ≤ 1/3− ε of the total amount of stake
currently available in the system. Here, ε quantifies the gain in the effective adversar-
ial power, related to the security parameter. This model, named the ”Stake Threshold
Adversary” by Abraham and Malkhi [1], is an alternative to the common Threshold Ad-
versary Model, which bounds the total number of parties the adversary controls relative
to the total population of the system, and an extension (or modification) of the Compu-
tational Threshold Adversary introduced by Bitcoin, which bounds the proportion of the
computational power owned by parties. Byzantine users can deviate from the protocol.
They are modeled by an adversary. The adversary can perfectly coordinates all mali-
cious users. It can learn the messages sent by honest users (i.e. non malicious users),
delay them, and then chooses messages sent by malicious ones. Further the adversary
is weakly adaptive: it can select at any time which users to corrupt in replacement of
corrupted ones (i.e. corruptions are ”moving”), however a corruption becomes effective
T blocks after the adversary has selected the user to be corrupted. The adversary is
computationally bounded so that it can neither forge honest nodes’ signatures nor break
the hash function and the signature scheme. Finally, we assume that all users (honest
and malicious) share an initial knowledge that we call genesis block which contains an
initial arbitrary UTXO set. We assume this block also shares the same properties as
regular blocks. How to setup the genesis block is out of the scope of this paper.
4 The Addressed Problem
STAKECUBE aims at allowing any honest user i to locally maintain a sequence of
blocks Bi0,B
i
1, . . . ,B
i
h, where h represents the index (or the height) of the block in the
sequence. This sequence of blocks represents i’s copy of the distributed ledger, and sat-
isfies both Safety and Liveness properties. In addition, the orchestration of the shards
allows STAKECUBE to satisfy both Scalability and Efficiency properties. STAKECUBE
is parametrized with an arbitrary security parameter κ , so that all its properties are
guaranteed with probability at least 1− e−O(κ).
Property 1 (Safety). If honest user i accepts a block Bih at height h in its copy of the
ledger then, for any honest user j that accepts a block at height h in its copy ledger,
B jh = B
i
h.
Property 2 (Liveness). If a honest user submits transaction tx, then eventually tx ap-
pears in a block accepted in the copy of all honest users.
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In STAKECUBE, participation of honest users is conditional to the possession of
UTXOs. Participation is voluntary: Any honest user can join a shard (determined by
the protocol), whenever she wishes, with the objective of eventually being involved in
the Byzantine resilient protocols executed in this shard. Participation is temporary: The
sojourn time of an honest user in a shard is defined by the time it takes for STAKECUBE
to create T blocks. Once she leaves, she can participate again by joining another shard,
and does so until she spends her UTXO. As users may own multiple UTXOs, they can
simultaneously and verifiably sit in different shards. In the following, a user that issues
a join request with its current credential is called an active user. STAKECUBE satisfies
Scalability and Efficiency properties. This is achieved due to the properties of the block
creation process. Adding a new block takes two Byzantine fault tolerant protocols to
be run in parallel within each shard, one network wide diffusion by each shard, one
inter-shard byzantine agreement, and finally one broadcast for the block (more details
will be given in Section 6.3).
Property 3 (Scalability). All Byzantine fault tolerant protocols we rely on have an
(overall) O(n3) message complexity. However in STAKECUBE these protocols are ex-
ecuted by committees whose size is small and fixed. Because the number of shard is
O(
√
N), the overall communication cost is O(NC31+C
3
2), with C1 and C2 some constants
depending on κ . Thus, each participant’s average communication cost is sublinear in N.
Property 4 (Efficiency). All Byzantine fault tolerant protocols we rely on use a constant
number of rounds. Thus adding a new block also takes a constant number of rounds.
Because a transaction, once diffused, will be included in the next block and blocks are
permanently attach to the blockchain, it takes at most two blocks to include a newly
received transaction.
5 A Set of Ingredients
To solve the addressed problem, STAKECUBE relies on the orchestration of the follow-
ing ingredients.
Cryptographic Primitives Digital signature together with random hash functions al-
low the implementation of verifiable random functions (VRF) [21]. In a VRF, a secret
key sk allows the evaluation y of hash function h on input x as well as the computa-
tion of a non-interactive proof that shows that the secret key sk is the only one that can
compute y. Verification of the proof is done with respect to the public key pk only. The
proof must remain sound even when pk is computed maliciously and h(sk,x) must re-
main pseudorandom even when an adversary can query values of h and proofs for them
for any input value x′.
Byzantine Vector Consensus A vector consensus protocol [12] is a Byzantine resilient
protocol where n participants agree on a vector representing the input value of each
participant. Validity condition states that in presence of f ≤ b(n− 1)/3c Byzantine
nodes, the vector contains at least f + 1 non-null values, and for each non-null value
vi 6=⊥,1≤ i≤ n, this value was initially proposed by participant i.
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Random Beacon A Random beacon is a service that provides a public source of ran-
domness. It was first proposed by Rabin [24] in the context of contract signing. In our
case, we need the random beacon to be emulated by a distributed protocol without
trusted third parties, that is, a protocol that satisfies the following security properties:
1. Guaranteed output delivery. All honest participants eventually output a value.
2. Unpredictable. Any adversary’s ability to predict any information about the beacon
prior to it being published is negligible.
3. Unbiased. For all adversarial strategies, the output is statistically close to a uni-
formly random string.
4. Publicly verifiable. The protocol also produces a proof that can be verified by third
parties to be convinced that a beacon is indeed the output of the protocol.
Suitable instantiations for the distributed setting includes SCRAPE [9] and RandHerd [25].
In the following we denote by µcore the minimum of the fractional resiliency of the vec-
tor consensus and random beacon protocols.
Verifiable Byzantine Agreement We use a verifiable Byzantine agreement in order to
agree on the next signed block despite corrupted shards. Our main requirement for this
algorithm is to be optimistic, i.e. efficient in the absence of faults. Indeed, the analysis in
Section 7 shows that the probability for a shard to be corrupted exponentially decreases
with shards core size. Any verifiable Byzantine algorithm satisfying our assumptions
can be used. We rely on the solution proposed by Shen et al [11] since it is leader-
based, efficient and tolerant to temporary partitions. The fractional resiliency of this
protocol is noted µcorrupted .
Distributed Hash Table (DHT) Distributed hash tables (DHTs) build their topology
according to structured graphs, and for most of them, the following principles hold:
each node of the system has an assigned identifier, and the identifier space, e.g., the set
of 256-bit strings, is partitioned among all the nodes of the system. Nodes self-organize
within the graph according to a distance function based on the identifier space.
Sharded DHT The notion of Sharded DHT is similar to a regular DHT, except that each
vertex of the DHT is a set of nodes instead of a single node. That is, nodes gather to-
gether into shards, and shards self-organize into a DHT graph topology. Sharded DHTs
can be made robust to adversarial strategies as achieved in SChord [15], and Peer-
Cube [3], and robust to high churn as achieved in PeerCube [3] by running Byzantine
tolerant algorithms within each shard. For these reasons, we rely on PeerCube architec-
ture, while weakening its model by removing the assumption of a global trusted party
supplying verifiable random identifier, and by removing the assumption of a static ad-
versary. For self-containment reasons, we now recall the main design features of Peer-
Cube. Briefly, this is a DHT that conforms to an hypercube. Each vertex (i.e. shard) of
the hypercube is dynamically formed by gathering nodes that are logically close to each
other according to a distance function applied on the identifier space. Shards are built
so that the respective common prefix of their members is never a prefix of one-another.
This guarantees that each shard has a unique common prefix, that in turn serves as a
shard’s label. The shard’s label characterizes the position of the shard in the overall
hypercubic topology, as in a regular DHT. Shards size is upper and lower bounded.
6
Whenever the size of shard S exceeds a given value smax, S splits into two shards such
that the label of each of these two new shards is prefixed by S label, and whenever the
size of S falls under a given value smin, S merges with another shard to give rise to a
new shard whose label is a prefix of S label. Each shard self-organizes into two sets,
the core set and the spare set. The core set is a fixed-size random subset of the whole
shard. It is responsible for running the Byzantine agreement protocols in order to guar-
antee that each shard behaves as a single and correct entity (by for example forwarding
all the join and lookup requests to their destination) despite malicious participants [4].
Members of the spare set merely keep track of shard state. Joining the core set only
happens when some existing core member leaves, in which case the new member of
the core set is randomly elected among the spare set. By doing this, nodes joining the
system weakly impact the topology of the hypercube [3].
6 Design Principles of STAKECUBE
STAKECUBE allows the creation of a permissionless distributed ledger in a PoS set-
ting. The key idea of STAKECUBE is to organise users (i.e. stakeholders) into shards—
such that the number of shards increases sub-linearly with the total number of active
UTXOs— and within each shard, to randomly choose a constant size committee in
charge of executing the distributed algorithms that contribute to the creation of blocks.
The randomization of shards members gives a statistical bound the number of ma-
licious participants sitting at each shards, ensuring the correct execution of the agree-
ment primitives. More precisely, we compute bounds that may still cause some shards
to have too much malicious participants (i.e. they become corrupted shards), but the
overall number of corrupted shards is bounded. This technique allows us to fix a small
shard size while keeping the ability to make security-efficiency trade-offs.
Each block at height h in the blockchain is unique, and is obtained by running an
inter-shard agreement procedure among a sub-committee of shards.
To be able to tolerate the presence of a Byzantine adversary, we must guarantee
that the adversary cannot predict the shards in which users will sit, and that the so-
journ time of users in their shard is limited. To achieve this, we introduce the notion of
unpredictable and perishable users’ credentials in Section 6.1. Then to cope with this
induced churn, we show how to update, sign a install the shards’ views in Section 6.2.
This process occurs right before the acceptation of a new block. Finally, as described
in Section 6.3 the creation of blocks is efficiently handled by an agreement among a
verifiable sub-committee of shards.
6.1 Unpredictable and Perishable Users’ Credentials
As described in Section 5, Peercube critically relies on a (global) trusted party supplying
verifiable random identifiers to nodes. In this section, we detail how to construct those
in our decentralized setting, using the already known public keys and some randomness
present in each block. For each unspent public key, i.e. for each UTXO, owned by a
user, a sequence of unpredictable and perishable credentials are tightly assigned to her.
Validity of a credential spans T blocks, with T some positive integer. The credential σ
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assigned to user i for its UTXO (pki,ski) is computed as follows. Let Bh0 be the block at
height h0 of the blockchain such that pki was created in Bh0 , i.e., it exists a transaction in
Bh0 such that pki appears in the output list of that transaction. For any blockchain height
h≥ h0+T , such that UTXO (pki,ski) still exists when Bh is accepted in the blockchain,
σpki(h) := H(pki||Bh′ .ρ), where h′ := h0+ b
h−h0
T
cT, (1)
with Bh′ .ρ a random number whose computation is detailed in Section 6.3. Suppose
that i’s UTXO (pki,ski) is created in block Bh. Then by Relation 1, i’s first credential
for UTXO (pki,ski) is computed based on the content of block Bh+T and perishes at
block Bh+2T . Then, i’s second credential for (pki,ski) is computed based on the content
of block Bh+2T and perishes at block Bh+3T , and so on until i spends (pki,ski). User
i’s credential uniquely characterizes the shard to which user i is allowed to sit, and this
shard is the one whose label prefixes i’s current credential σpki(h). By the non-inclusion
property of PeerCube [3], there does not exist a shard whose label is the prefix of another
shard, and thus, there is a unique shard whose label prefixes credential σpki(h). When
her current credential expires, i leaves the shard she is in, and if she wants to continue
to participate to STAKECUBE, joins a new shard based on her new credential.
There are a couple of details that should be noted.
1. User i does not need to participate in STAKECUBE for the entire life of her UTXO
(pki,ski). She can join STAKECUBE (i.e. join a shard) at any time h under credential
σpki(h), however once a user joins her shard, she must stay online (and actively
participates if she is a core member) until σpki(h) expires. As a result, there does
not exist any explicit leave request. A leave simply consists in not issuing a join
request upon credential renewal. A consequence of this rule is that, in case user i
participates under credential σpki(h) and spends her UTXO (pki,ski) before σpki(h)
expires, then i continues to participate under σpki(h) until σpki(h) expires. Note that
because a transaction only grants credentials after a delay, this rule does not allow
a user to simultaneously own multiple credentials for the same stake. Note also that
if i is disconnected for a small amount of time this does not jeopardized the safety
of the shard only its liveness.
2. Recall that the adversary has a bounded fraction µ of stake in STAKECUBE. To
defend STAKECUBE against Sybil attacks (i.e., the fact that the adversary creates
a considerable number of UTXOs with the objective of overpopulating each shard
with malicious owners of those UTXOs), we require that each UTXO cannot be
credited with more than M stake, with M some predefined constant. Consequently,
by the fact that for any h > 0 one credential σ(h) represents exactly one UTXO,
there is a bound µcred > µ on the fraction of malicious credentials in STAKECUBE,
which is reached when all malicious UTXOs have 1 stake and all honest ones max-
imize their stake, i.e., each honest UTXO has M stake. Note that UTXOs with M′
stake, such that M′ > M may be handled by granting them dM′/Md credentials,
although we do not treat this case explicitly. Section 7 analyzes the distribution of
malicious credentials among shards.
Regarding the behavior of the adversary, there are a couple of remarks to note.
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1. At any time, the adversary might spend some selected UTXOs in order to cre-
ate new ones and thus new credentials with the objective of targeting some shards.
However, because of the initial T blocks delay required to obtain the first credential
for an UTXO (see Relation 1), any newly created UTXO will give rise to a creden-
tial only after all existing credentials are renewed as well. Therefore, the adversary
has no preferred strategy regarding transactions and forced renewal.
2. Each block Bh contains a random seed, denoted by Bh.ρ , which cannot, by con-
struction, be either biased or predictable before the block is created (how such
seeds are generated is detailed in Section 6.3). Thus by Relation 1, the adversary
cannot determine nor influence the value of renewed credentials. Consequently, for
any blockchain height h ≥ 0 and for any pki, σpki(h+ T ) is unpredictable while
for any 0≤ h′ ≤ h, the sequence (σpki(h′+T ))0≤h′≤h is computable and verifiable
from the blockchain.
6.2 Shard Membership
As described above, during the period of time that elapses between the creation of an
UTXO to its spending, the UTXO owner can participate to the blockchain construction
by successively joining a series of shards. In practice this may give rise to a voluminous
amount of join requests, which might be highly prejudicial to STAKECUBE’s scalability
and efficiency if each joining request led to the insertion of the newcomer in the core
which run the distributed operations. Rather, by relying on PeerCube design (see Sec-
tion 5), a newcomer joins the spare set of the shard and not its core set. This newcomer
will be a candidate for being elected as a member of the core set whenever the core set
will undergo a membership modification. Management of the view composition, and
election in the core set is the purpose of the remaining of the section.
View of a Shard The view of a shard S reflects the composition of both its core and
spare sets, denoted respectively by Sc and Ss. Update of the view is strongly correlated
to blockchain events: any block appended to the blockchain is preceded, in each shard,
by the update and the installation of the shard view. In the following, the view of shard S
installed right before block Bh is appended to the blockchain is denoted by viewS(h). We
have viewS(h) = (Sc(h),Ss(h)), where Sc(h) (resp. Ss(h)) represent the composition of
S’s core set (resp. spare set) at time h.
Update of the Shard View When a newcomer (i.e. a user under a valid credential)
issues a request to join her shard S, her request is propagated and broadcast to the
members of Sc. Core members i locally store the join request in their buffer bi of pend-
ing requests. Note that expiration of credentials do not need to be locally memorized,
prior to being handled by the view update algorithm, since by Relation 1, credentials
can only expire when a new block is appended to the blockchain. Let viewS(h− 1)
be the current view of S when a (honest) core member i ∈ Sc(h− 1) receives some
valid block Bh (Section 6.3 details the creation of blocks). The following three steps are
successively executed:
1. A Byzantine vector agreement protocol is run among Sc(h−1) members to decide
on the set of newcomers: core members i propose their local buffer bi, and the
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outcome of the protocol is a vector v(h) of newcomers such that non-null values
for honest core members i are equal to their buffer bi. Each honest core member
i replaces its local buffer bi with the union of the users of the decided vector. We
have bi = ∪b j∈v(h),b j 6=⊥b j.
2. Each user i ∈ Sc(h− 1) removes from bi the set rS(h) of users whose credential
expires with Bh. User i initializes a new spare set Ss(h) with Ss(h) = bi∪Ss(h−1)\
rS(h), and orders Ss(h).
3. Each user i ∈ Sc(h− 1) initializes a new core set Sc(h) with Sc(h) = Sc(h− 1) \
rS(h). If Sc(h− 1)∩ rS(h) 6= /0, some previous core members i ∈ Sc(h− 1) have
credential that expire with Bh. As a consequence, an election among the users of
Ss(h) is carried out for i’s replacement, so as to keep |Sc(h)| = smin. The core
election works as follows:
(a) A random beacon protocol is run among Sc(h− 1) members to decide on a
common random seed ρ .
(b) A pseudo-random number generator PRG(ρ) is initialized with ρ as seed.
(c) PRG(ρ) is used to draw a random number j ∈ J1, |Ss(h)|K. The j-th member of
Ss(h) is removed from Ss(h) and added to Sc(h). This process is repeated until
|Sc(h)|= smin.
Once these steps are completed, each core member j installs her new view view jS(h)
with the new values of Sc(h) and Ss(h), signs it, and sends it to the spare members. Once
a spare receives µcoresmin+1 signatures on the same view, it installs it. In the meantime,
each core member j resets its buffer b j = /0. Note that multiple join requests may lead
a shard S to split into two shards, or, on the contrary, may lead two shards S ′ and S ′′ to
merge within a single one S. The treatment of such topological changes are omitted in
the above procedure for space reasons, but can be derived from [2].
To summarize, the shard membership procedure ensures that, for any shard S of
STAKECUBE, all members of S install the same view viewS(h) before appending block
Bh to their copy of the blockchain.
Diffusing Views Merely installing the new view for each shard is not sufficient. We
need the other shards of STAKECUBE to maintain this knowledge to be able to verify
any signed information exchanged during inter-shard communication (e.g. during the
block proposal procedure, see Section 6.3). Therefore, whenever a new view viewS(h)
is installed along with its µcoresmin + 1 signatures, it is also broadcast to the whole
network as a notification of the view update. Note that shards only store the last view
viewS ′(h) of any other shard S ′ and not the whole history of S ′ views. Moreover, a new
view viewS ′(h+ 1), can be verified against the last view viewS ′(h), so that corrupted
shards can only lie on their core members and omit newcomers.
6.3 Construction of the Next Block of the Blockchain
We propose a Byzantine resilient cross-shard mechanism to agree on a unique valid
block, despite the presence of at most fshard corrupted shards (see Section 7 for fshard
computation). Indeed, the presence of an adaptive adversary may compromise the safety
of some shards by succeeding in having more than a proportion µcore of malicious users
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sitting in their core set. Although the probability of such event can be made arbitrarily
low (see the analysis in Section 7), we must handle it. The presence of corrupted shards
put us in the same situation as in a consensus protocol: given the same initial chain,
any shard is able to create the next block, and the decision must be a unique block,
despite malicious users lying or not responding. As will be shortly described, agreeing
on a unique valid block is efficiently and robustly achieved by running a Verifiable
Byzantine Agreement among a subset of the shards of STAKECUBE randomly selected.
Reaching Consensus on the Next Block The process of creating a new block Bh starts
right after Bh−1 has been accepted. A committee of shards, denoted in the sequel by C,
is elected among the shards of STAKECUBE. The election of each of these shards relies
on the seed of block Bh−1, derived from the random beacon protocol. Once elected,
committee C executes a verifiable Byzantine agreement to decide on the unique block
Bh to be appended to the blockchain. The main steps of this process are as follows:
1. All shards S compute the elected committee C, similarly to the core election pro-
cedure (see Section 6.2), i.e.,
(a) Let L be the set of all the shards’ labels (recall from Section 6.2 that each shard
diffuses its new view viewS(h)). L is then ordered through a canonical order.
(b) A pseudo-random number generator PRG(Bh−1.ρ) is initialized, where Bh−1.ρ
is the seed of the last block Bh−1.
(c) PRG(Bh−1.ρ) is used to draw a random number j ∈ J1, |L|K. The j-th member
of L is removed from L and added to C (initially initialized to /0). This pro-
cess is repeated until C contains sC shards, with sC = ( fshard/µcorrupted)+ 1.
Recall that fshard is the maximal number of corrupted shards in STAKECUBE
(whose computation is presented in Section 7), and µcorrupted is the fraction of
malicious nodes tolerated by the Verifiable Byzantine Agreement protocol (see
Section 5).
2. Members of committee C run the verifiable Byzantine Agreement protocol, with
their proposed block Bh as input (the construction of the proposed block is de-
scribed in the next paragraph). Finally the decision is a block Bh′ signed by 2 fshard+
1 shards.
3. Block bh is broadcast in STAKECUBE and appended to STAKECUBE users’ copy
of the blockchain.
Security remark: By definition of sC, committee C cannot be corrupted, independently
of the shards selected by the election. Committee C is still chosen randomly for two
reasons. First, it naturally spreads the load of creating a block across the whole network.
Second, it prevents corrupted shards from trying to manipulate the election process to
get in the committee and slow it down. Note that at this stage a random seed is already
available from the last block and thus there is no need to run a distributed random
beacon.
Efficiency remark: We rely on a leader-based Byzantine Agreement algorithm to benefit
from its optimistic efficiency. Indeed, since fshard can be made arbitrarily small (see
Section 7), and the members of committee C are randomly selected, we expect the first
leader to almost always be an honest shard.
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Construction of the Proposed Block. We finally describe how each shard S of C con-
structs its block Bh (see the above case 2). The construction results from an agreement
on the content of block Bh among the core members of S and on the generation of the
seed of Bh. Let viewS(h) = (Sc(h),Ss(h)) be the current view of shard S .
1. Each core member in Sc(h) proposes (i) its list of pending transactions and (ii)
its VRF value seeded with Bh−1.ρ together with the VRF proof, to the Byzantine
Vector consensus protocol. The decision value is a vector of input values, such
that non-null values for honest core members are equal to their list of pending
transactions and their VRF value and VRF proof.
2. Construction of block Bh is then realized as follows.
– The hash of the previous block Bh−1 is inserted in Bh’s header.
– The union of transactions from the decided vector defines Bh’s body.
– The hash of the concatenation of the VRF values of the decided vector defines
the seed Bh.ρ of Bh.
– The list of VRF proofs of the decided vector is inserted in Bh’s header as a
proof of randomness for seed Bh.ρ .
The reason why the random beacon protocol is not reused is because it is supposed to
be run within a non corrupted shard. For the We have different requirements. First, we
want the seed to be close to random even in the case of corrupted shards. This does
come at the cost of giving the adversary a bounded number of choices for the seed.
Second, we do not mind that a corrupted shard may decide to abort the computation of
the seed, because we cannot prevent it from not proposing a block anyway.
7 Security Analysis
We analyze the probability that some of the shards of STAKECUBE are corrupted, that
is that their core set contain more than µcoresmin malicious users. In the following we
denote by ν the fraction of corrupted shards. To conduct such an analysis, we examine a
simplified scenario. We approximate the behavior of STAKECUBE by taking the amor-
tized execution over one period of T blocks. That is, we study the corruption probability
when all the shards are built and the cores are elected over one period. This is equivalent
to the scenario in which all credentials are synchronously renewed at the same block.
Note that, for a fixed number of active users, the number of credential renewals, core
election, and topological changes is statistically the same for every period of length T .
7.1 Corruption Probability of a Core Set during a Period of T Blocks
Let s be the size of shard S , µshard be a bound on the ratio of malicious users within
S, and µcore be the fractional resiliency of both the Vector Agreement protocol and
Random Beacon one. We assume that 0 ≤ µshard < µcore ≤ µ . We compute an upper
bound on the probability that the fraction of malicious users in the core set is higher
than µcore by the end of the period. As described in Section 6.2, the core set is elected
by randomly taking smin credentials from shard S , without replacement. Let Y be the
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random variable equal to the number of malicious credentials within the core, i.e., Y
follows an hypergeometric distribution whose probability mass function is given by
∀k ∈ J0,sminK,P[Y = k] = (bsµshardck
)(bs(1−µshard)c
smin− k
)(
s
smin
)−1
. (2)
We are interested in deriving the probability that after T core renewals the core set
S is corrupted. The core set corruption refers to the situation where the proportion of
malicious credentials in the core exceeds µcore. Applying the Hoeffding bound [17] on
Relation (2) leads to the following bound
P[Y/smin ≥ µcore]≤ e−2(µcore−µshard)2smin .
Thus, assuming that the fraction of malicious users in a shard is below µshard , the cor-
ruption probability over T blocks exponentially decreases when smin increases.
7.2 Distribution of Malicious Credentials among all Shards
The above section assumes that the fraction of malicious users in all the shards is below
µshard . In this section we compute an upper bound on the probability that this assump-
tion does not hold. We make simplification assumptions on how the shards are formed.
First, we assume that there are K shards of size S, giving rise to i.e. N := SK creden-
tials in total. Second, we assume that shards configuration in STAKECUBE during the
concerned period results from a random credential assignment to all the shards. Recall
that µcred is the overall ratio of malicious credentials. Let Xi be the random variable
representing the number of malicious credentials in the i-th shard, with 1 < i < K.
And finally, we note X = (X1, . . . ,Xk) ∈ {0,S}K be the vector made of these K ran-
dom variables. Random variable X represents the distribution of malicious credentials
in STAKECUBE. It follows a multivariate hypergeometric distribution, i.e., each of the
N = SK credentials is assigned to a shard. We analyse the shard assignment of a ran-
dom sample of size Nµcred . Let I be the set of vectors representing STAKECUBE when
Nµcred credentials are malicious. We have
I = {x ∈ [0,S]K |
K
∑
i=1
xi = Nµcred}
and
∀x ∈ I,P[X = x] =
(
N
Nµcred
)−1 K
∏
i=1
(
S
xi
)
.
We are interested in computing the probability that a given shard j among the K
ones contains more than m malicious credentials, that is, let Im, j be defined as follows
Im, j = {x ∈ I | x j ≥ m}.
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We have:
P[X j ≥ m] = P[X ∈ Im, j]
= ∑
x∈Im, j
(
N
Nµcred
)−1 K
∏
i=1
(
S
xi
)
=
S
∑
k=m
(
S
k
)(
N
Nµcred
)−1
∑
x1,...,xK−1∈[0,S]
∑1≤i≤K−1 xi=Nµcred−k
∏
1≤i≤K,i 6= j
(
S
xi
)
.
Knowing that ∑1≤i≤K−1 xi = Nµcred − k and ∑1≤i≤K−1 S = N − S, we can apply
Vandermonde’s identity:
∀ j,P[X ∈ Im, j] =
S
∑
k=m
(
N
Nµcred
)−1(S
k
)(
N−S
Nµcred− k
)
.
We now get our result by applying first the (univariate) Hoeffding bound, and then the
union bound.
∀ j,P[X ∈ ISµshard , j]≤ e−2(µshard−µcred)
2S.
Thus the probability that at least one shard of the system contains more than µshardS
malicious credentials is bounded by
P[X ∈ ∪Kj=1ISµshard , j] ≤ Ke−2(µshard−µcred)
2S
= e−(2(µshard−µcred)
2S−lnK).
Term ∪Kj=1ISµshard , j is the set of shards assignations to malicious credentials, such that
at least one shard has a fraction greater than or equal to µshard of malicious credentials.
Moreover, due to the union bound, this upper bound also holds if the shards have dif-
ferent sizes and S is the minimum, hence, we can simply use S := smin. As for K, the
worst case is reached when there is a maximal number of shards, i.e. K := N/smin.
7.3 Putting it all Together
In the previous subsection we got exponentially decreasing bounds on the probability
that at least one shard is corrupted, i.e., proving security when the bound on the number
of malicious shards fshard is set to 0. We let for future work the generalization of this
calculation with arbitrary values of fshard , which would give us tighter parameters.
The adversary has a fraction µ of stake. Requiring each credential to be associated to
at most M stake gives us the following (worst case) ratio of malicious credentials, which
is reached when each malicious UTXOs has 1 stake and each honest one maximizes its
stake, i.e., has M stake. We then have:
µcred =
1
1+M−1(µ−1−1) .
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Thus M should be as small as possible to decrease the adversary effective stake.
However low values of M may require users to participate with a large number of cre-
dentials in parallel, increasing the communication cost for individual users. Knowing µ
and security parameter κ , the parameters µshard and smin can be obtained by solving the
following inequalities
µshard ≤ µcred +
√
κ− ln Nsmin
2smin
and smin ≥ κ2(µcore−µshard)2 .
8 Conclusion & future work
In this paper we have presented STAKECUBE a new blockchain protocol which aims at
improving scalability of the block-wise Byzantine agreement approach by combining
sharding techniques, users presence and stake transfer to operate in a PoS setting. Each
block at height h in the blockchain is by design unique (no fork), and once a block is
accepted in the blockchain, the next one is created by a sub-committee of shards whose
selection depends on the random seed of the last accepted block.
The next step is to take into account the stake associated with each credential as
weights into both the core election and the election of the shard in charge of creating the
next block. This will allow us to get rid of the µcred−µ gain in adversarial power, while
keeping the remaining of the security arguments similar. More generally, refinements
of the security analysis will give us the ability to instantiate STAKECUBE with better
parameters while keeping the same security level.
We also plan to implement a prototype of STAKECUBE to demonstrate its efficiency
and scalability properties, and to showcase some possible applications.
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